Senior Officials Workshop: Preparedness and Response for Terrorist Incidents
FAQ

Q: What is a terrorist event?

A: While there are many definitions of a terrorist event, some of which are codified in State law, for purposes of this workshop we are using the FBI definition found on page 1-9 of this guide:

"The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

Q: What is the focus of this workshop?

A: The focus of this workshop is on the local policy issues for senior city officials in preparing for and responding to terrorist incidents involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons/agents. See page 1-10 of this guide.

Q: Why was this workshop developed?

A: To provide critical information and training to senior city officials anywhere in the United States and its territories.

Q: How does this workshop compare with the workshop of the same name being offered by the U.S. Army CBDCOM Domestic Preparedness program?

A: This workshop has the same content and objectives but has been modified for delivery as a freestanding program. It will be delivered as part of the Workshop in Emergency Management series by State and local personnel. The workshop is intended to provide senior officials outside of the largest metropolitan areas with an opportunity to learn about responding to incidents involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to analyze their plans and policies in regard to this response. The workshop should be delivered by two instructors but can be delivered by one, if necessary. It should result in a plans, and policy review.

The CBDCOM workshop is part of a multi-phase program that includes six train-the-trainer courses for responders, as well as drills and exercise. Planning sessions and follow-up meetings with CBDCOM staff and local leaders are part of the CBDCOM program. The overall program provides not only training but also training equipment. See pages 19-23 in the Read-Ahead Package.

Q:Who should attend this workshop?

A: The Mayor and/or the City Manager should attend the workshop, along with members of the Mayor’s Cabinet (Department Heads). Although the titles for these personnel will vary between cities, they usually include the following: Fire Chief or Commissioner, Police Chief or Commissioner, Director of Medical Services, Public Works Director, Chief Financial Officer, Emergency Management Director, Chief of Economic Development, Superintendent of Schools, Recreation Director.

It may be necessary to involve persons from neighboring jurisdictions if key functions (e.g., a regional or county police force) are provided by another jurisdiction, particularly under a mutual aid agreement.

Because the city should coordinate response actions through the county government to the State government, it is recommended that an appropriate representative from each of these governments be present, particularly during the exercise, when assistance is requested through higher levels of government.

When possible, experience has shown that it is helpful to include the local Special Agent in Charge from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Although other Federal or State agencies may want to be represented, it is not necessary. If they come as observers, it is important to remind the audience that the focus of the training is on the needs and actions of the local government.

The workshop will not be successful without the support and participation of local executives.

Q:Who should coordinate the workshop?

A: Either a State or county emergency management agency training officer or the instructor could coordinate the workshop. A member of the local executive’s staff could also coordinate the workshop and fulfill the role of the local point of contact.

The workshop coordinator must assemble the local resources required to conduct the session. The coordinator must keep in touch on a regular basis with the local point of contact throughout the workshop planning period.

It may be necessary to use and/or adapt the coordinator’s information contained in the front of the Workshop Guide. The coordinator will have to be flexible enough to tailor the seminar for the audience.

Q:Where can either the instructor or course coordinator or the community get further information?

A: This workshop includes information about Federal training on weapons of mass destruction preparedness, as well as telephone numbers for support and additional information. In many States, training agencies have received grants to provide additional training in preparing for and responding to WMD incidents. Many States have established a point of contact within the State emergency management agency for terrorism or WMD issues. Materials are also available from both FEMA and the USFA web sites.

It is recommended that you carefully read the Read-Ahead Package for this course and visit the Domestic Preparedness website at: http://www.cbdcom.apgea.army.mil/Missions/dp/index.html

and the FEMA Rapid Response Information System at:

http://www.fema.gov/rris

Q:Why are terrorism and counterterrorism being emphasized so much at this time?

A: There are several reasons for the high visibility of terrorism today. On the international front, there is fear that the loss of the former Soviet Union’s controlling influence over client states will lead to more extreme action by some of those countries. This fear includes concerns that some nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and material may have fallen into the hands of extremist groups. At the same time, the United States, as the remaining superpower, becomes the largest target on Earth. Many groups feel that our country is the source of much that they oppose.

Second, some domestic elements are taking positions on political and social issues that are so extreme that active action against this country is a real possibility. Some of these elements are actually planning attacks on this country’s infrastructure. This fact has produced major media attention for these groups and the threat that they may or may not create.

Finally, the reliance that American society places on technology, the approach of the millenium, the increased dissatisfaction with government at all levels, and the realization that many social programs have not succeeded have all added to the unease that many Americans feel. This atmosphere allows the actions of extremist groups to have a magnified impact when shown in the media’s 30-second "sound-bite" format. It also causes some to search out alternatives, including violence, to induce change.

Q:Haven’t we always had terrorist groups, both domestic and foreign, in this country, and haven’t most of them just faded away without hurting anyone?

A: American history is full of groups that would be classified as terrorist under today’s definition. Whether it was the Red Scares of the 1920’s, the union organizing campaigns of the 20’s and 30’s, or the Puerto Rican Liberation Front in the 1950s, groups have often come to the point at which violence seemed to be the only step left. Some of these groups, such as the Symbionize Liberation Army, the Weather Underground, and the Black Panthers were active as recently as 15 to 20 years ago.

Many of these groups held multi-year reigns of terror before authorities countered them or they faded away. Many people were killed and many businesses destroyed "for the cause" by these groups. The difference today is that some groups may be able to gain control of weapons of mass destruction.

Q:Why is there public sensitivity to terrorism today?

A: Several recent incidents have drawn both public and media attention to this issue.

First, the long reign of terror of the Unabomber helped the American public realize that there was a domestic terrorism threat that could strike anyone. The Unabomber’s attacks also revealed the problem law enforcement personnel have in dealing with a terrorist or group who did not include a large number of people in his or her efforts.

The World Trade Center bombing was the first terrorist strike that made Americans realize that we are not protected against attacks originating from overseas. This event also made us realize how many people could be at risk in a single incident. The impact was compounded by the fact that Wall Street was not generally considered as a terrorist target. Watching the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing in the media caused us to focus.

The attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City showed that the heartland of America was at risk, as well as the East and West Coasts. This event also showed that the United States faces homegrown terrorist threats, not just those from overseas. The attack showed how just plain folks, including children, were at risk.

Media attention on Waco and Ruby Ridge, and news stories about the Aryan Nation and other groups, have helped to change our opinion of fringe groups from something to laugh at to something to worry about. These investigative reports have shown that there are elements that believe in violent opposition to American government, social policy, and culture.

While not fitting the Federal definition of a terrorist event, the series of post office-related incidents has caused the creation of a new acronym in our language. This has had an impact on how the average citizen views violent attacks. Along with today’s rash of school-related killings, these events highlight our exposure to violence in seemingly peaceful places. This heightened sensitivity has also allowed the allocation of resources on preparedness activities, such as this workshop.

Q:Why are emergency responders more concerned about terrorist incidents now than in the past?

A: The increased weaponry used by persons engaged in ordinary criminal events raises the issue of how well law enforcement is prepared in the event of a well-financed attack by groups that fit the terrorist definition. The use of modern body armor, high-powered ammunition, and semi- and fully-automatic weapons makes the operation of law enforcement and even special teams more difficult. This difficulty increases the need and desire for police officials to carry out intelligence operations involving possible terrorist groups.

The search for the Unabomber and the person suspected of the Atlanta and Birmingham bombings shows how routine law enforcement procedures work very slowly in such events. Yet, the rush to see foreign elements as responsible in the Oklahoma City explosion shows how moving outside normal and trusted procedures can cause more problems. This dilemma places law enforcement leaders in a very precarious position as they try to prepare for terrorist events.

Fire and EMS personnel have long felt that the public generally sees them as rescuers and not as part of poor government. This perception was widespread and often stated as a matter of pride, although attacks on non-police responders during the first Move Confrontation in Philadelphia in the late 1970’s and during the Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King incident should have shown how fragile this perception really was. The placing of bombs in the Atlanta area that were designed to injure fire and EMS personnel and disrupt rescue operations showed that these types of attacks were not accidental but deliberate. This hostility is something that fire and EMS officials have not dealt with in their planning—and causes conflict with the practice of moving in and helping those in need.

The use of sarin by the group responsible for the Matsumoto and Tokyo attacks revealed possible problems with the capability of civilian responders to handle military chemical and biological agents. While training has been conducted since these events occurred, it has focused on the major metropolitan areas. This leaves responders in rural areas, where many feel that terrorists prepare and train, with the feeling that they will be caught short in the event of an incident. Many responders do not want to see a repetition of the series of fatal incidents involving hazardous materials in the 1980’s, culminating with the Bhopal incident where over 3,000 were killed and 200,000 injured, before effective corrective action is taken.

Overall, the readiness of Federal agencies to share with local government the training and equipment relating to terrorist events has reinforced the feeling in local responders that response to terrorism is an area of critical deficiency that must be addressed as soon as possible.

Many persons in the emergency and public safety communities are concerned about possible biological incidents. Some feel that these incidents may be the most dangerous and long-term events. Moreover, public safety experts feel that the notice of a biological incident will come not from the law enforcement or emergency response agency but from the medical or public health community. The issues of detection and assessment in these events will be critical. Yet, many feel that the response capability nationwide is most lacking in the area of biological incidents, despite their obvious danger and the relative ease with which a biological incident could be perpetrated by either a terrorist group or by a lone terrorist.

Q:How effective will standard personal protective equipment (PPE) be during a WMD incident?

A: The type of weapon chosen by the terrorist will drive the use of a particular type of PPE by responders. The size of the device and the amount of time that has elapsed will also affect the PPE required for the response.

For example, equipment designed for use during or after a nuclear attack or for a nuclear power plant accident should have application during a nuclear WMD incident. Much of the higher-level protective equipment used by hazardous materials response teams should be useable during chemical incidents. Protective equipment similar to that used in research facilities would also be useable during biological incidents.

The participants may ask whether the standard PPE issued to most police, fire, and EMS responders is effective in a WMD incident. Several studies are underway to evaluate such protective equipment against a series of chemical agents. The results of these studies are not yet public.

You might suggest that the participants contact the manufacturer of the specific equipment and inquire as to its suitability for extreme emergency life-saving operations and extended tactical operations when exposed to the list of possible agents.

Of equal importance as the suitability of equipment is personnel training and experience in the use of PPE. Are local law enforcement personnel adequately trained in the use of PPE—or will hazardous materials teams or fire personnel have to plan to work with Federal personnel in WMD incidents? These are policy issues that local policymakers must address before a WMD event if additional training is to be accomplished. It will be too late to realize that an issue exists at the scene.

Q:What concerns do law enforcement agencies, especially those at the State and Federal level, express with the multi-agency involvement that is occurring in terrorism preparedness and response?

A: Law enforcement and emergency responders, such as fire, HazMat, and EMS, have always diverged in how they approach incidents. This divergence is perhaps most obvious in arson investigation and environmental crimes. The differences in approach can become more obvious when local, State, and Federal agencies share on-scene responsibility for the same event.

Fire, EMS, HazMat, and Emergency Management agencies operate in an atmosphere of open information exchange. Their jobs require them to try to obtain as much detailed information about the situation and events as they can. This approach can run counter to law enforcement’s need to protect sources because death can occur if the source is compromised. This difference in approach to handling information can lead to clashes in operational activities.

Law enforcement must be concerned with security and evidence preservation. Otherwise, the investigation and prosecution of those involved in the crime may be compromised. So, too, the use of informants can be compromised by release of information that can point to its source. (For example, recent revelations about the detailed knowledge held by British officials prior to the air raid on the city of Coventry shows what moral dilemmas face officials in such positions.)

Additionally, the criminal investigation can be compromised by release of information by officials not under a public or press right-to-know law to those that are so covered. Investigations—both here and abroad—could be compromised by information innocently released by another agency.

Law enforcement personnel also are sensitive to the possibility that members of the group involved may hold public safety positions. The military and Federal and State police agencies are targets of terrorist recruitment campaigns. It is conceivable, therefore, that local police and fire/EMS agencies may also be recruitment targets. (For example, a fire official recently was arrested for passing plans of Federal office buildings to the leadership of a militia style-group to which he belonged.) It is very understandable that law enforcement has reservations about information sharing.

It is possible for law enforcement and other response agency personnel to work together successfully, however. For example, successful interagency activity has occurred within the framework of interagency task forces. These task forces bring together all interested local, State, and Federal agencies in an atmosphere of cooperation and joint effort. Use of a Unified Incident Command System approach to on-scene activities has also proven successful for coordinating response agency personnel.

Remember that there will almost always be multi-governmental responsibility at terrorist events. In Oklahoma City, there was Federal prosecution for the murders of Federal agents and may also be prosecution for civilian deaths by State and local authorities.

Terrorists will not care who won the last budget battle. They will view all agencies that protect public safety, whether public, private, industrial, local, State, or Federal, to be part of the target choices. Policymakers must establish cooperative approaches as the norm for agencies that historically have been competitive. Local, State, and Federal policy-making officials must make it clear that divergent philosophies and attitudes will not be tolerated when it comes to terrorism preparedness.

Q:How will I, as the instructor, cover all of this information in the time allotted?

A: To conduct this workshop, you must be prepared in several areas. Of course, you must have solid mastery of the material in the workshop Read-Ahead Package. You will also find it helpful to review background material from other sources, such as FEMA and other agencies. Spend some time researching in the Internet, but be aware of bogus information.

Additionally, you must assess the terrorism threat in the jurisdiction receiving the training. If it is located in a rural area, you may be in an area that groups may use to train and plan terrorist activities. Try to meet with local law enforcement authorities. Ascertain from them, if possible, what their threat assessment is for the area. Emphasize to local enforcement personnel that your workshop offers a chance to influence policymakers.

Work with the local workshop coordinator to make the session more realistic for the class. If you have to modify the exercise to fit the area, allow enough time to revise it professionally and accurately. Ask someone to review your rewrite.

Remember that some groups have targeted military and police units for recruitment. You may have members of such groups in your audience. Do not engage them in debate. Rather, present the material as an opportunity for the local community to learn and review their system and procedures.

There may be persons in the class who want to discuss hypothetical issues or situations. Handle them without wasting valuable class time. Ask them to see you during a break.

Remind the class that there are other training programs out there. Where possible, gather information from local and State training agencies about other training opportunities in the local area or from State agencies. Ask the local workshop coordinator to see what training is available from within the agencies that will be attending.

Timing of the class will be important. Rehearse your presentation several times to become familiar with how the workshop flows. Do not read the slides. Add, in your own words, the additional information contained in the Workshop Guide. Feel free to add examples from your own experience that apply to the subject, but do not become embroiled in telling "war stories."

Q:What is new in the area of counterterrorism?

A: The issue of protecting the nation’s critical and vital infrastructure has been made a priority, especially in the areas of computers and transportation. You may have heard or seen in the newspapers that the President recently signed two new Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs). These documents have changed the response system somewhat. The PDDs allow for designation of a National Anti-Terrorism Coordinator.

Additionally, there are several new funding initiatives being considered for future Federal budgets. Some propose support to local governments. There are legislative proposals to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and domestic preparedness. Local governments must keep up to date on all these changes and routinely review plans and procedures to integrate programmatic changes when they occur.